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Introduction
On April 6, 2016, United States Interior Secretary Sally Jewell, alongside Oregon
Governor Kate Brown and California Governor Jerry Brown, signed the Klamath
Hydroelectric Settlement Agreement (KHSA). Together, they announced they would be
moving forward with a plan to remove four hydroelectric dams from the Klamath River,
allowing several species of endangered fish to swim freely to their former spawning
habitats. The decision was met with widespread enthusiasm. ‘“We’re starting to get it
right after so many years of getting it wrong… What a beautiful day’”1, remarked Brown.
The Interior Department’s decision to approve dam removal without approval from
Congress was seen as a saving grace for the Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement.
The Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement (KBRA), released in 2010, is a 250
page water use agreement signed by the State of Oregon, the State of California, three
Indian tribes, four county governments, seven non-governmental organizations and 26
private individuals, companies and local irrigation districts. The purpose of the agreement
was to settle a decade-long conflict between local farmers, irrigators, fishermen, Indian
tribes, the United States Bureau of Reclamation, federal wildlife agencies and
environmental organizations.

1

Lacey Jarrell, “Future of the Klamath,” Herald and News, April 7, 2016, accessed April
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Negotiations for the KBRA began following the dramatic summer of 2001, when
the Bureau of Reclamation shut off the main water source for the Klamath Project, an
irrigation system that provides water to farmers in the Klamath Basin. The Bureau
believed it had no choice, because it felt obligated by the Endangered Species Act to
maintain a sufficient water level in Upper Klamath Lake to protect the local population of
Lost River and shortnose sucker fish.
This thesis seeks to contextualize the Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement, and
explore the confluence of Western water rights, Indian law, the Endangered Species Act,
and the plight of arid farming. It will evaluate the KBRA’s contents and then evaluate the
way forward for the agreement to become law. It will also explore whether an agreement
like this is the best way of resolving such disputes as opposed to litigation or directly
through the legislative process. While the KBRA is not perfect, and its future remains
uncertain, it nonetheless provides clarity to a patchwork of conflicting laws, norms and
court decisions. Although the KBRA was officially terminated at the beginning of 2016
due to a lack of congressional authorization for the agreement, the Interior Department’s
recent decision to allow dam removal has revived the KBRA’s chances of becoming a
law. Although it has yet to be enacted and its effects yet to be known, the KBRA
represents the best way to provide clarity and stability to the Klamath Basin.

2

Chapter I
The Klamath Basin: A Background
The roots of the Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement stretch back to white
settlement of the Klamath Basin. Additionally, one could argue that its origins go even
further back to the basin’s geological formation millions of years ago. Therefore, before
exploring the agreement, one must first understand its subject. The Klamath Basin has a
long and complex history, with each piece of history manifesting itself in a different way.
It also has several unique geographical, geological and topographical features that make
the area, and thus the agreement, unlike any other.
The Klamath Basin is centered on the Klamath River in southern Oregon and
northern California. The Klamath River is one of only two rivers (the other being the
Columbia River) that cross both the Coast Range and the Cascades. The 263-mile river
originates in Upper Klamath Lake, near Klamath Falls, Oregon. The river flows south
into northern California, where it picks up flows from the Scott, Shasta, Salmon and
Trinity Rivers, before emptying into the Pacific Ocean near the aptly named town of
Klamath, California.2 The size of the Klamath Basin adds to its complexity, as well as its
difficulty to regulate. Overall, the Klamath River watershed “covers some 12,000 square
miles, an area roughly the size of Maryland and bigger than eight other U.S. states”.3 A
water crisis in such a large area will prove to be difficult to handle.
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The population of the Klamath Basin is as sparse as the basin is large. Klamath
Falls, Oregon, the largest town in the basin, has a population of only 20,000. The Lower
Klamath Basin has a population of only 15 people per square mile.5 The region’s
remoteness and low population often make it an afterthought for its state governments.
The legislatures of California and Oregon focus predominantly on the more populated
metropolitan areas of Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Diego, Portland and Eugene. For
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this reason, in the 1940s several residents of the area proposed that counties in southern
Oregon and northern California secede from their respective states and form the State of
Jefferson, with its capital located in Medford. Just as the movement was gaining
momentum in late 1941, the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor, focusing national attention
on the ensuing war.6 Although the State of Jefferson proposal never gained serious
consideration, the sentiment of abandonment by state officials persists throughout the
Klamath Basin.
The Klamath Basin is an atypical watershed: “The typical watershed is steepest
and wettest in its upper reaches, near the source of the river, and flattest and driest near
its mouth. The Klamath reverses that pattern.”7 The Klamath River originates in the high
desert, and the landscape becomes more lush as it approaches the ocean. The Klamath
“flows through high sagebrush plateaus, then cuts through mountains into the sea. The
Lower Basin is a rugged, inaccessible jumble of steep peaks and small valleys.”8 This has
proven to be difficult for farmers, because most agricultural lands are on the northern end
of the basin. “Most of the runoff in the Klamath watershed occurs in this lower region, far
downstream from the primary agricultural lands.”9 Herein lies a fundamental flaw in the
Klamath Basin: instead of farming in the downstream areas with plenty of water, the
farmers are instead farming where water is scarce. This requires a substantial amount of
irrigation. “An irrigation economy developed in the driest, least watered portion of the
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basin and a commercial and recreational fishing economy in the wettest. That unusual
combination has proven difficult to sustain.”10
Another irregular feature of the Klamath Basin is the lakes that feed the Klamath
River. Upper Klamath, Lower Klamath and Tule Lakes used to be conjoined in one large
lake measuring 1,000 square miles, covering much of the modern day Klamath Basin.
Climate and geological changes caused the waters to recede and the three lakes to
separate. Now, the Klamath River drains mostly from Upper Klamath Lake. Upper
Klamath Lake is the largest lake in Oregon, when measured by surface area. However, its
water supply is very limited due to its shallowness. The lake is, on average, only eight
feet deep. During dry years, the depth of Upper Klamath Lake can sink as low as three
feet. In some senses, Upper Klamath Lake more closely resembles a marsh or wetlands
than a lake. This can be problematic for farmers, because the water source for irrigation is
often dry and can be unreliable. Due to its shallowness, Upper Klamath Lake “is not
capable of storing surplus water during wet years to buffer the system in critically dry
years.”11 During dry years, there is no existing water supply from previous wet years to
fall back on. During these dry years, the water supply can be cut significantly short:
“Unlike many reclamation projects, the Klamath Project is at the mercy of the weather
every year; a single dry year can put water supplies at risk.”12
The Klamath Basin can be divided into two distinct regions: The Upper Klamath
Basin, located primarily in Oregon, and the Lower Klamath Basin in California. As
mentioned previously, the Upper Klamath Basin is a dry area, and a difficult place to
10
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farm. Despite its aridity, the Upper Basin contains a large amount of fertile volcanic soil.
However, “because of severe climatic conditions, none of the lands in the region fall in
the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s highest productivity class.”13 Due to the Klamath
Irrigation Project, the agricultural lands in the Klamath Basin have thrived over the past
century. The region is used primarily to grow hay, alfalfa and potatoes. Overall, the
Upper Basin is home to 2,239 farms, of which 1,744 are irrigated by the Klamath
Project.14 Any change in irrigation levels affects over three-quarters of the region’s farms.
Therefore any reduction in water levels, whether through drought or bureaucratic action,
would have a significant impact on the region’s economy.
Although the ancient Klamath lake has since dried up and divided into three,
wetlands and marshes still exist where the old lake stood. These marshes are critical
habitats for many species of waterfowl, including geese, ducks and swans. The Klamath
Basin is an important stop along their migratory route, and for this reason several national
wildlife refuges exist in the Upper Basin. “The cluster of national wildlife refuges in the
Upper Basin supports the greatest concentration of waterfowl in North America,
providing ‘a migratory stopover for about three-quarters of the Pacific Flyway waterfowl,
with peak fall concentrations of over 1 million birds.’”15 Additionally, the refuges host
the United States’ largest population of bald eagles from December through February,
making the Klamath Basin a popular destination for ecotourism.16 Hundreds of thousands
of visitors are drawn to the wildlife refuges every year.

13
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The Lower Klamath Basin is quite different from its counterpart to the north.
Located entirely in northern California, the Lower Basin is where the Klamath River
picks up the flows of the Scott, Salmon, Shasta and Trinity Rivers. Consequently, the
region is much more lush and forested. “Geologically, the Lower Basin is an area of rapid
tectonic uplift, which accounts for the steep, forested terrain through which the Klamath
[runs].”17 The Lower Klamath Basin is labeled as an “area of biotic significance” by the
World Wildlife Fund due to its location within the Klamath-Siskiyou bioregion.18 The
steep hills of the Lower Klamath Basin make the region less suitable to farming. Instead,
timber harvests are the area’s main economic export. However, timber sales are declining
in the Lower Basin, following a nationwide trend. Unlike the Upper Klamath Basin, “a
high proportion of the land in the Lower Basin is owned by the federal government.”19
The Lower Basin is very empty, and is even more sparsely populated than the Upper
Basin. The largest towns in the Lower Basin are Yreka and Weaverville, towns with
populations of 7,000 and 3,500, respectively.20
The stark differences between the Upper and Lower Basins also manifest
themselves in their fish populations — although these differences are not fully natural.
Coho and chinook salmon, steelhead, green sturgeon and Pacific lamprey are all abundant
in the Lower Basin. Before the damming of the Klamath River, these fish were free to
swim all the way upstream to Upper Klamath Lake. The species have sharply declined

17
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over the years, but are bolstered by fisheries at Iron Gate Dam and at Trinity Reservoir.21
The fish populations in the Klamath River are especially important to coastal
communities. Commercial fishers catch salmon that swim to and from the mouth of the
Klamath River, and depend upon these salmon runs to earn revenue. Commercial
fisheries along the Klamath River existed until the 1920s, until they were abandoned.
However, ocean fisheries continue to depend on Klamath River salmon. Compared to the
farms in the Upper Klamath Basin, the ocean fisheries of the Lower Basin have a much
larger economic impact. “Even with ocean fishing restrictions imposed to protect
Klamath fish, chinook salmon landings in northern California in 2006 were valued at
roughly $5.25 million… According to an environmental group, each salmon caught
brought $86 to the local economy, each steelhead $172.”22 Ocean fishermen depend on
abundant salmon runs to earn a living and can feel the direct economic impact of
declining salmon populations. They also feel the impact through tougher regulations on
the amount of fish they can catch: “According to a fishing advocacy group, regulatory
limitations on ocean salmon fishing have cost the coastal economy some four thousand
jobs and $78 million annually for the last decade.”23
The stark contrast between the Upper and Lower Klamath Basins is apparent, and
it shows the diversity of interests at stake in the Klamath Basin. It is important to keep the
geography and topography of the Klamath Basin in mind, as they will play a large part in
the various crises and agreements.

21
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Chapter II
Water Rights: Riparian Rights vs. Prior Appropriation
The doctrine of prior appropriation, a system of allocating water rights adopted
throughout much of the American West, follows one rule: “Qui prior est in tempore,
potior est in jure — he who is first in time is first in right.”24 Essentially, prior
appropriation states that the first person to come upon a river or a stream has the right to
use it with almost zero limitations. The water, at that point, becomes personal property.
Under prior appropriation, “it mattered not at all how far from the river [one] lived or
how far [one] diverted the water from its natural course, mattered not at all if [one]
drained the river bone-dry.”25 Whoever first discovered a water source could make as
much use of it as they wished, regardless of who arrived afterward.
This doctrine is in sharp contrast to the riparian principle, which was developed
under English common law. The riparian doctrine “held that only those people living on
the banks of a river could lay claim to its flow.”26 Under riparian law, one could not
divert a river or stream elsewhere, and one could only consume the water for a reasonable
use, such as drinking or bathing. “The riparian doctrine was less a method of ascertaining
individual property rights and more the expression of an attitude of noninterference with
nature. Under the oldest form of the principle a river was to be regarded as no one’s

24
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private property.”27 The doctrine of riparian rights rested upon the idea that natural
features such as streams and rivers belonged to God, and could not be privately owned.
However, it is important to note that the riparian doctrine was developed in England,
whose rivers and streams thrive in a climate much less prone to drought, unlike the arid
rivers of the American West. The riparian doctrine proved to be unsuited for the settlers
of the American West, including those in the Klamath Basin. “Riparianism depended on
there being a dependable abundance of rainfall, broadly distributed, but just as important,
it rested on a popular acceptance of the idea that nature should be left free to take its
course.”28 Indeed, the riparian doctrine seemed out of place in the Western United States,
and it conflicted with the entrepreneurial spirit of many early settlers: “The men and
women who settled the American West did not belong to that older world, did not share
its views about nature, and consequently rejected the traditional riparianism.”29
The doctrine of prior appropriation was first developed in mining communities in
the mid-19th Century. Under prior appropriation, the first person that uses water or diverts
a stream for a beneficial use “is guaranteed the right to continue to take the same amount
of water from the source without interference by any later appropriator.”30 Under a
riparian system, during a drought or a water shortage, “the right of each riparian owner is
diminished proportionally.”31 With prior appropriation, in case of a drought, “the entire
share of the latest appropriator is lost before the share of the next latest begins to

27
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diminish.”32 Many proponents of prior appropriation believed it was absolutely necessary
for settlement of the American West. American historian Walter Prescott Webb believed
the riparian doctrine “was clearly out of place in a more arid climate, for it would not
have allowed the practice of irrigation and thus would have made agricultural settlement
impossible.”33 The Western United States is a much different place from England, or
even the Eastern United States. Thus, a new system was needed to allocate water rights.
This is not to say that the United States universally adopted prior appropriation. In
fact, the federal government has never fully endorsed the idea, and many western states
operate under a strange blend of riparianism and prior appropriation. Holly Doremus calls
the statutory adoption of prior appropriation a “historical accident.”34 The appropriative
system “is a creature of local custom rather than federal law.”35 Prior to settlement of the
West, the federal government only recognized riparian water claims. Because almost all
land on the shores of western rivers, including the Klamath, was initially owned by the
federal government, anyone wishing to receive a water claim would have had to consult
the federal government, rather than the relevant state government. However, white
settlers began to settle in the West, including the Klamath Basin, long before the federal
government was able to effectively assert its control over the area. “It was not until the
progressive conservation era that the federal government began to assert its rights, and by

32
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that time it was too late.”36 Western settlers essentially forced prior appropriation on the
federal government, which it begrudgingly accepted.
In 1877, Congress passed the Desert Land Act to encourage the development and
irrigation of arid public lands in the west, such as the Upper Klamath Basin. The Act
states that “all surplus water… shall remain to be held free for the appropriation and use
of the public for irrigation, mining, and manufacturing purposes.”37 Many western states,
including California and Oregon, interpreted this clause to mean that the federal
government was tacitly adopting the doctrine of prior appropriation. They argued that
“Congress had severed all water from the public domain… Put differently, the states
argued that Congress had promised never to assert federal water rights.”38 While not
explicitly embracing prior appropriation, the statute leaves it up to the states to choose
their own system of water rights, whether riparian or through prior appropriation.
California and Oregon both made their own systems for allocating water rights.
Both states employed a certain mix of riparian and prior appropriation systems, but they
differed in many important ways. Unlike other western states, California and Oregon did
not reject the federal government’s superior claim to water titles. Both states “reasoned
that [they] acquired sovereignty when they entered the union but that the federal
government retained proprietary rights to the public domain.”39 Using this logic,
California created a dual riparian-prior appropriation system. Using the Desert Land Act
of 1877’s tacit approval of prior appropriation, they limited the doctrine to federal lands.

36
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Any private and non-federal lands still observed the riparian rights system. If a piece of
federal land was privatized, it would no longer observe prior appropriation. In places like
the Klamath Basin, where a large amount of land is controlled by the federal government,
prior appropriation still prevails. In 1909, California adopted a permit system for prior
appropriation, and “continues to recognize preexisting riparian rights.”40
Oregon, on the other hand, rejected such a dual riparian-appropriative system. The
state also passed a prior appropriation system in 1909. However, unlike California, which
recognized preexisting riparian rights, Oregon terminated its riparian rights altogether,
and, “in effect… turned many riparian rights into appropriative rights.”41 Anyone who
claimed a riparian right that existed before the law’s passage in 1909 needed to reapply
for the right to be recognized: “To claim a pre-1909 riparian right, the user had to show
either that the water was put to a beneficial use before 1909 or that the necessary
diversion works were completed within a reasonable time after 1909.”42 The law states,
“the right to the water shall be limited to the quantity actually applied to a beneficial
use,”43 echoing appropriative terminology.
In 1909, the Oregon Supreme Court handed down Hough v. Porter, in which it
upheld the state’s right to enforce prior appropriation. Like many western states, the
Court used the Desert Land Act of 1877 to justify its reasoning. The Court wrote, “the
Desert Land Act by the language used appears to reserve therefrom to the entire public
the right of any citizen, after March 3, 1877, to divert, use, and acquire a right in and to

40
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the unappropriated waters flowing through, or adjacent to, any lands thereafter patented,
such right to be determined by priority.”44 (Hough v. Porter, 51 OR 318). The decision
seemed to settle the question in Oregon, but the federal government would not acquiesce
until several decades later. The question of the legitimacy of state prior appropriation
laws remained up in the air due to two state courts issuing rulings opposite of that in
Hough v. Porter. In 1911, the Washington Supreme Court handed down a decision that
did not accept Oregon’s reasoning, and “held that the Desert Land Act related to the
reclamation of desert lands only.”45 In 1921, the South Dakota Supreme Court followed
Oregon’s lead, but one year later the California Supreme Court followed Washington’s
line of reasoning. With California and Oregon having different interpretations of the
federal government’s role, water claims in the Klamath Basin became especially
complicated.
The issue was partially settled several years later in 1935, in the U.S. Supreme
Court decision California Oregon Power Company v. Beaver Portland Cement Company.
Writing for the Court, Justice George Sutherland affirmed the Oregon Court’s reasoning
in Hough v. Porter. He reasoned that if surplus water is indeed intended to be used for
public irrigation and mining, “if this language is to be given its natural meaning, and we
see no reason why it should not, it effected a severance of all public waters from the
public domain, not theretofore appropriated, from the land itself.”46 Here Sutherland is
using the exact same reasoning as the states did following the passage of the Desert
44

Hough v. Porter, 51 OR 318, 387 (Or. 1909).
Wells A. Hutchins, Water Rights Laws in the Nineteen Western States (n.p.: The
Lawbook Exchange, 2004), 174.
46
California Oregon Power Company v. Beaver Portland Cement Company, 295 U.S.
142 (1935).
45

15

Lands Act. Sutherland goes on, “From that premise, it follows that a patent issued
thereafter for lands in a desert land state or territory, under any of the land laws of the
United States, carried with it, of its own force, no common-law water right to the water
flowing through or bordering upon the lands conveyed.”47 The Court accepted the
reasoning that the Desert Land Act applied to land laws beyond simply deserts. It argued
that following the enactment of the Desert Land Act, “all nonnavigable waters then a part
of the public domain publici juris, subject to the plenary control of the desert land states
and territories.”48 California Oregon Power Company was an important turning point in
the development of water regulation, especially for the Klamath Basin. It essentially
established a precedent that the federal government must defer to the states in the area of
water law: “Despite the conservation era, revivals of Indian sovereignty, and the modern
environmental movement, deference to state water allocation decisions remains a bedrock
principle of western water law.”49 But how binding is this precedent? Is it even a
precedent at all? Is it constitutionally sound? After all, both Oregon and California
continue to recognize the supremacy of the federal government, at least statutorily.
Federal deference to state water law has a “constitutionally erroneous history, [with] the
power of a cultural bedrock myth. It explains today why the idea that the Endangered
Species Act, or any other environmental law, can displace appropriative rights strikes
many western water users as both heretical and shocking.”50 The Endangered Species Act
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will be discussed later, but it is important to note that recent conservation legislation can
be seen as not only a violation of tradition, but of legal precedent.
Due to these complexities, the distribution of water rights in the Klamath Basin
has proven to be difficult. The next chapter, which focuses on the Klamath Irrigation
Project, will assess these difficulties.
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Chapter III
The Reclamation Act and the Klamath Project
Perhaps the most important legislation to consider when contextualizing the
Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement is the United States Reclamation Act, passed in
1902 during Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency. Historian Robert F. Gorman has gone so
far as to say that “no single law has had a greater effect on the western United States than
the Reclamation Act of 1902.”51 The Reclamation Act established federal funding for
irrigation projects throughout the American West, including the Klamath Project.
In the late nineteenth century, the irrigation of arid western lands was a slow
process. Funding for irrigation was scarce, and private irrigators were often unwilling to
take the risk to fund large-scale irrigation projects. State-funded irrigation efforts proved
to be unsuccessful due to low finances. A more stable form of irrigation funding was
needed. The Reclamation Act established the United States Reclamation Service, an
agency of the Department of the Interior. The agency was later renamed the United States
Bureau of Reclamation, as it is known today. The act empowered the Secretary of the
Interior to “locate and construct, as herein provided, irrigation works for the storage,
diversion, and development of waters.”52 The act established a financing mechanism for
these irrigation projects. It set a side a reclamation fund financed by the sale of federal
lands. “Homesteaders would repay the fund for project construction costs (without
interest) within ten years of the time that water became available to them, and the
51
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52
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repayments would then allow new projects.”53 The fourth section of the Reclamation Act
authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to make contracts for the construction of the
irrigation projects. Interestingly, a caveat determining labor requirements mandates that
“in all construction work eight hours shall constitute a day’s work, and no Mongolian
labor shall be employed thereon.”54 Such an artifact in the legislation serves as a
reminder that much of the West was developed at the expense of Asian immigrants, as
well as Native Americans and other minorities.
The Reclamation Act was indeed an integral part of the development of the
Western United States. The Bureau of Reclamation initiated many of the projects that
transformed the West from a remote frontier to a thriving, modern economy. Through
authorization from the Reclamation Act, the Bureau has not only built irrigation canals,
but also hydroelectric dams and power plants in seventeen states throughout the West,
from Oklahoma to Washington. Perhaps the most famous Bureau of Reclamation project
is the Hoover Dam on the Colorado River. Several western cities, such as “El Paso,
Denver, Tucson, Phoenix, Los Angeles and Salt Lake City could not have grown into
great metropolises without the massive water development projects and associated
hydroelectricity made possible by the act.”55 Although cities such as Klamath Falls and
Yreka are far from “great metropolises,” the Reclamation Act has been equally important
for the development of the Klamath Basin.
The Klamath Irrigation Project, or Klamath Project, was initiated under the
Reclamation Act in 1905, three years after its passage. It was the twelfth project
53
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undertaken by the newly created Bureau of Reclamation (then called the Reclamation
Service). It was the Bureau’s largest project yet. In authorizing the Klamath Project, the
Bureau gave three conditions. First, the states of Oregon and California had to cede their
titles to the beds of Lower Klamath and Tule Lakes. Second, all riparian rights claimed
on the waters of these lakes had to be surrendered. The states quickly complied with these
demands. However, the third condition, a requirement that all vested water rights in the
Klamath Basin be adjudicated, has still not been met.56 Finally, Congress authorized
Interior Secretary Ethan Allen Hitchcock “to destroy navigability of the two lakes.”57
Construction of the Klamath Project began in 1906 with the digging of the main
canal. This canal is also commonly referred to as the ‘A’ Canal. The project’s first dam,
the Lost River Dam, was constructed in 1912. A detailed description of several aspects of
the Klamath Project is necessary:
The Klamath Project incorporated several privately built canals and,
Reclamation initially constructed Clear Lake Dam and Reservoir,
Lost River Diversion Dam, and the A (Main), B (East Branch), and C
(South Branch) Canals on the Project. Clear Lake Dam and Reservoir
stored water on the Lost River. Water releases from Clear Lake
traveled downstream the diversion facilities at Lost River Diversion
Dam which then transferred the water into the canals, including D
(Adams) and G (Griffith) Canals. In the 1920s, Reclamation increased
the irrigable lands of the Klamath Project. To this end, Reclamation
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constructed Gerber Dam and Miller Diversion Dam on Miller Creek,
and Malone Diversion Dam, on Lost River, to irrigate lands northwest
of the original Klamath Project lands through the North and West
Canals. The Lower Lost River (Anderson-Rose) Diversion Dam
increased irrigable acreage in the California lands of the Klamath
Project. Reclamation added E (North Poe) and F (South Poe) Canals
northeast of the original Project lands, and J Canal in the southeast.
Following World War II, Reclamation started reclaiming land around
Tule Lake for agriculture. Reclamation drained the marsh lands and
constructed irrigation facilities necessary for future farms, including M,
N, P, Q, and R Canals.58
To further understand the scope of the Klamath Project, a map is included:

59
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The Klamath Project was finally completed in the 1960s. As of 2008, the Klamath
Project “diverts about 1,345,000 acre-feet to irrigate approximately 240,000 acres in
Oregon and California. An additional 175,000 acres in the Upper Klamath Basin are
irrigated by private irrigation works upstream of the project.”60 While the project does
provide much-needed irrigation to the surrounding basin, it is remarkably inefficient: “2
acre-feet are lost to evaporation for every acre-foot actually consumed by the crops.”61
In the 1950s, shortly before the completion of the Klamath Project, questions
arose about how all the water would be used, and which uses would be prioritized. This
culminated in the Klamath River Basin Compact. The Compact was precipitated by the
California Oregon Power Company (COPCO)’s proposal to build a hydroelectric facility
on the Klamath River. The new plant would be located “in the Klamath River Canyon
below Keno, midway between Klamath Falls and the California border. COPCO claimed
that unappropriated water was available, and that the use of water to generate power
should take priority over future irrigation in the Upper Basin.”62 However, irrigators in
the Upper Basin pushed back, and argued that irrigation should be prioritized over power
generation. What resulted was an interstate compact that was negotiated by both
California and Oregon, and presented to Congress. Since both Oregon and California
“were beneficiaries of the same project, they pulled together to make sure that water
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[stayed] in the Upper Basin.”63 The Klamath River Basin Compact passed Congress in
September 1957. The Compact “established the following order of use for water: (1)
domestic use, (2) irrigation use, (3) recreational use, including use for fish and wildlife,
(4) industrial use, (5) generation of hydroelectric power, and (6) such other uses as are
recognized under laws of the state involved.”64 The Compact was a major victory for
irrigators in the Upper Klamath Basin. In addition to prioritizing irrigation over
hydroelectric power generation, it also prohibited any water from the Klamath Project to
be diverted outside of the Klamath Basin.65
Nonetheless power companies still play an important role in the Klamath Basin.
Since the Klamath River Basin Compact was ratified, COPCO was purchased by
PacifiCorp. PacifiCorp currently owns six hydroelectric dams on the Klamath River: Iron
Gate Dam, COPCO 1, COPCO 2, John C. Boyle Dam, Link River Dam, and Keno Dam.
Iron Gate Dam, COPCO 1 and COPCO 2 dams are located just south of the CaliforniaOregon border, while the John C. Boyle, Link River and Keno dams are further north in
Oregon. These dams were developed between 1903 and 1962 as part of the Klamath
River Hydroelectric Project. The hydroelectric dams provide incredibly cheap power for
Klamath Project irrigators. This cheap power is the product of an agreement dating back
to 1917, when irrigators and the Bureau of Reclamation allowed COPCO, who operated
the dams at the time, to construct Link River dam. “In return for the ability to regulate the
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outflow of Upper Klamath Lake, subject to existing irrigation rights, and construct the
Link River dam, the company agreed to furnish cheap power to protect irrigators.”66 In
return for allowing construction of dams on the Klamath River, irrigators received
heavily subsidized power rates. “The original 1917 agreement between COPCO and the
Bureau of Reclamation called for the utility to furnish power at 0.6¢ per kilowatt hour.
The contract was renegotiated in 1956, but the irrigators have not faced a rate increase
since 1917.”67 This has proved to be extremely beneficial to the local farmers and
irrigators. “Power costs are crucial to the economics of irrigation, since they determine
the amount of land that can be profitably planted.”68 Therefore cheaper power not only
means lower costs, but also more farming and more revenues. It is no wonder why some
people are uneasy about the removal of the dams from the Klamath River, because they
could potentially see electricity prices increase well beyond their current rates.
The obscenely low rates paid by the irrigators proved to be unsustainable for
PacifiCorp in the mid 2000s. In 2004, PacifiCorp petitioned the Oregon Public Utility
Commission to raise their rates in the Klamath Basin by a factor of ten. Klamath
irrigators were justifiably upset by this proposal and pushed back. This was seen as a
violation of the original agreement allowed PacifiCorp to construct its dams in the first
place. Nonetheless, a tenfold increase in electricity rates is not as harsh as it initially
seems. Electricity rates in the Klamath Basin remained unchanged since 1917 — 87 years
of constant prices despite rising costs and inflation. The rates were so low that
multiplying them by ten would still be slightly below the rate paid by the average Oregon
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customer.69 While most agreed that keeping rates at 1917 levels was unsustainable, any
sudden increase in power rates, however minimal, poses a risk of seriously disrupting
many irrigators. As a compromise, the Oregon legislature passed a law in 2005 “that
limited any increase in electric fees for Klamath irrigators to no more than 50 percent in
any one year.”70 In 2006, the Oregon Public Utility Commission moved forward with a
plan to bring power rates in the Klamath Basin back to near the state average over eight
years. Klamath irrigators promptly challenged the plan at the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, arguing that “the federal license governing PacifiCorp’s Klamath
hydroelectric project forbade any rate increase before a new license was agreed upon.”71
The FERC rejected that argument and allowed the rate increase to move forward. Under
PacifiCorp’s plan, the first year of the transition would see a 36 percent rate increase. A
prolonged period of incremental rate increases allows irrigators to adjust somewhat
easily. Irrigators in the Upper Klamath Basin “will still enjoy a substantial subsidy for the
short term, [but] that is enough of an increase to impose a financial jolt. As farmers in the
High Plains know, increased energy costs can force hard decisions, such as decisions to
retire the land or invest in more efficient irrigation technology.”72 With dam removal on
the horizon, there was a possibility that irrigators’ power rates could jump.
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Chapter IV
The Klamath Indian Tribes
The Klamath Basin is home to five Indian tribes: the Modoc, Klamath, Yurok,
Karuk and Hoopa. The Modoc and Klamath live in the Upper Basin, while the Yurok,
Karuk and Hoopa reside in the Lower Basin. Indian tribes have a special status under the
law and occupy a unique place in the Klamath Basin agreements. Each tribe has its own
interests and history, which will be explained briefly.
The Klamath Basin went largely unexplored during the first half of the nineteenth
century. The first white people to explore the Klamath Basin were fur trappers in the
1820s. The fur trappers described the abundance of the Klamath Basin, which prompted
John C. Frémont to explore Upper Klamath Lake in 1843.73 However it was not until
1867 that white Americans permanently settled in the area. The supplier of Fort Klamath,
a military outpost in Klamath County, set up a store on the Link River. The settlement
grew into a town called Linkville, whose name was officially changed to Klamath Falls
in 1891.74
The Klamath Basin was the site of the dramatic and bloody Modoc Wars in the
1870s. One of the last wars of its kind, the Modoc War was largely a response to the
federal government’s grouping of the Modoc and Klamath Indians into a single tribe.75
Although the Modoc and Klamath tribes share a common language, their customs and
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lifestyles differed, and some animosity existed between the tribes. “The Klamaths
regarded the Modocs, who subdued tribes further south for slaves, as a historic oppressor
and enemy.”76 The Modocs did not like having to live on the same reservation as the
Klamaths, and some accused the Klamaths of mistreatment. In 1873 the Modocs, led by
Kintpuash, commonly known as Captain Jack, left the Klamath reservation and
demanded their own reservation in their ancestral home. A battle ensued in the lava beds
near Tule Lake, where Captain Jack and 50 Modocs somehow managed to fight off 400
U.S. soldiers. Following months of peace negotiations, the Modocs grew frustrated and
killed General Edward Canby. Captain Jack and several other Modocs were subsequently
hanged at Fort Klamath, and the Modoc tribe was promptly relocated to Oklahoma.
Today, most Modocs still live on their reservation in Oklahoma. Those who stayed in
Oregon have been absorbed by the Klamath tribe.77 Therefore, the Modoc tribe is not an
official party to the Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement.
The Klamath, along with the Modoc, belong to the larger Snake Paiute Tribe.
Prior to white settlement, the Klamath occupied 22 million acres of the Klamath Basin.
Their control over land was greatly diminished once white settlers arrived and they were
forced onto a reservation. “The 1864 Treaty of Council Grove, which settled many Indian
land claims, gave the two groups 2.2 million acres, about one-tenth of the Klamath’s
historic territory. Later, the reservation was shrunk to about 1 million acres.”78 White
Americans attempted to assimilate the Klamath into their society by converting them to
Christianity and forcing them to abandon their nomadic ways by becoming irrigators. The
76
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Klamaths proved to be surprisingly well-suited to the change, and proved to be skilled
farmers: “By the 1950s, they had created a sustainable timber and grazing economy on
the million-acre reservation; their incomes were almost the same as those of non-Indians
in the region.”79
Unfortunately, things did not turn out well for the Klamath. The first step in the
wrong direction was the General Allotment Act of 1877. The Act could be described as
an attempt “to transform Indians into yeoman farmers in the mold of their white
neighbors and to stamp out all vestiges of tribalism”80 Judge William C. Canby, Jr. called
the Allotment Act “the most disastrous piece of Indian legislation in United States
history.”81 Before passage of the Allotment Act, congressional approval was required for
the transfer of Indian reservation lands. The Allotment Act provided each tribal member
with 160 acres per household, and surplus lands were then auctioned off to white settlers
without congressional authorization. Many owners of the allotted lands were forced to
sell their property due to high state property taxes.82 The proceeds from the sales of the
land went toward Indian schools. Ultimately, the General Allotment Act accounted for
the sale of over one quarter of the Klamath reservation.83 The nationwide result of the
Allotment Act was even more profound: from 1887 to 1934, the total amount of Indianheld land in the United States decreased from 138 million acres to 48 million — a
decrease of over 65 percent84.
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This would not be the last time the Klamath tribe would lose its land. In the 1950s
the Klamaths fell victim to a movement to terminate their tribal status. Following World
War II, the United States “decided to solve the ‘Indian problem’ once and for all by
eliminating reservations and forcing Indians to become plain old Americans. In modern
terms, the federal government wanted to make the Indians ‘white.’”85 The movement for
termination was not necessarily undertaken maliciously. It was a naïve attempt to achieve
equality by removing the Indians’ special status of “otherness.” After all, in the 1950s
whites enjoyed the most privileges of any racial group — so why not extend those
privileges to the Indians by stripping them of their tribal status? Several proponents of
termination believed they were setting the Indians free — or at least used this belief as a
rhetorical device to advance their goals of reclaiming Indian land. Such rhetoric
“contained an element of the arrogant condescension of those who see themselves as
conferring a superior way of life on the less fortunate.”86 This reasoning was not
altogether unpopular or unpersuasive — in the 1950s a substantial proportion of Klamath
Indians supported termination. Therefore, Congress passed the Klamath Termination Act
in 1954. The law states, “Individual members of the tribe shall not be entitled to any of
the services performed by the United States for Indians because of their status as Indians
and… all statutes of the United States which affect Indians because of their status as
Indians shall no longer be applicable to members of the tribe.”87 Once the Klamath
Termination Act was passed, “the Klamaths would essentially become non-Indians for
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legal purposes, ineligible for federal Indian benefits, and fully subject to state law.”88
Along with the Klamaths’ status as Indians, the Klamath reservation was also
disestablished. The Termination Act precipitated the sale of the vast majority of the
Klamath Reservation Forest. “Tribal members had the choice of immediately selling their
interests, which terminated tribal membership, or holding onto them… With no other
viable option, more than three-fourths of the Indians elected to cash out for $43,000
each.”89 Following their termination, some Klamaths attempted to join other tribes, but
were rejected by the Interior Department, which held that the Termination Act banned
them from doing so.90 The buyouts from the Termination Act proved to be short lived,
and the Klamath tribe suffered greatly. Deprived of their reservation and the institutional
framework of a federally recognized tribe, many Klamaths fell victim to alcoholism,
gambling and crime. Poverty increased. The Klamaths soon realized they had been
cheated by the Termination Act, and engendered an “enduring bitterness… between the
tribe and the white community.”91
The Klamath tribe’s situation finally improved in 1986, when Congress passed the
Klamath Indian Tribe Restoration Act. The law reinstated the tribal status of the
Klamaths, but unfortunately did not return any land to the tribe. The Klamath reservation
is now confined to 372 acres, a tiny fraction of the 2.2 million acres they were granted in
the Treaty of Council Grove in 1864, and less still than the 22 million acres they once
occupied prior to white settlement. The Klamath tribe’s land situation is important in the
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context of the Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement. Due to the tribe’s superior water
title (which will be discussed later), the tribe is able to use its water rights as a bargaining
chip to regain some of their lost land. The Klamaths “proposed to trade land for control
of water, offering to subordinate its water rights to those of the irrigators in return for
695,000 acres of national forest.”92
Downstream in the Lower Klamath Basin are the Yurok, Karuk and Hoopa tribes.
Prior to white settlement of the Lower Klamath Basin, the Yurok tribe lived further down
the Klamath River, near its confluence with the Trinity River. The Karuk lived further up
the Klamath, and the Hoopa lived in the Hoopa Valley on the Trinity River. In 1855,
President Franklin Pierce, under authority granted by Congress, signed an executive order
establishing the Klamath River Reservation, which consisted of one mile of land on both
sides of the Klamath, extending 20 miles from the river’s mouth.93 The reservation was
not intended for a sole tribe. Rather, like the merging of the Klamath and Modoc tribes, it
was intended to accommodate multiple tribes in the area. Some tribes were more open to
this idea than others: “The Yurok did not need much convincing to settle on this
reservation, which was within their traditional lands and straddled their river with its
abundant salmon.”94 On the other hand, the Hoopa tribe refused to relocate. In 1877
President Grant finally acquiesced and issued an executive order establishing the Hoopa
Valley Reservation on the Trinity River.95 There was much confusion about the status of
these reservations due to an 1864 law that only permitted the President to establish a
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maximum of four Indian reservations per state. Because more than four such reservations
existed in California, the legitimacy of the Yurok and Hoopa reservations was cast into
doubt. Fortunately, President Benjamin Harrison found a way to sidestep the statute and
combined the two reservations by extending the Hoopa Valley Reservation all the way to
the Pacific Ocean, encompassing the Yuroks’ Klamath River Reservation.96 However,
the legal complications did not end there. The union of the two reservations gave rise to a
dispute between the Yurok and Hoopa tribes over the distribution of timber income on
the reservation. Some Yuroks claimed they were entitled to a share of the timber
revenues from the Hoopa reservation, and the courts agreed.97 In response to these
decisions, Congress passed the Hoopa-Yurok Settlement Act in 1988. The Act once again
partitioned the joint reservation into two reservations belonging to the Hoopa and Yurok
tribes. The Hoopa retained their rights to their original reservation, while the Yurok
retained their reservation as well as the passage that connected the two reservations
mandated in Harrison’s 1891 executive order.98 Although the repartition of the Hoopa
and Yurok reservations managed to settle most of the tensions between the tribes, some
property disputes still persist.
The Karuk Indians, on the other hand, do not have their own reservation. When
the Hoopa and Yurok reservations were joined in 1891, it was expected that the Karuk
were also to live on this newfound reservation.99 Like the Hoopa who refused to live on
the Yurok reservation, most Karuk abandoned the joint reservation and returned to their
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original homelands. While the Karuk are officially recognized by the federal government,
instead of living on their own reservation, the Karuk “now occupy scattered ‘trust lands,’
parcels held in trust for the tribe or individual Karuk by the United States. The Karuk
trust lands total roughly 750 acres.”100 The Karuk’s lack of a reservation has proven to be
a disadvantage, both economically and legally, because land ownership is a central
principle of American Indian law: “The distinctive legal feature of Indians in the United
States is that their identity is tied to a specific land base. All Indian law flows from that
characteristic.”101 With less of a firm hold on their land, their sovereign rights are limited.
A bedrock principle of American Indian law is the recognition of tribal
sovereignty. The idea was first developed in the early days of the Supreme Court by
Chief Justice John Marshall. In the 1823 case Johnson v. McIntosh, Marshall ruled that,
unlike other sovereign nations, Indian tribes could only grant their lands to the federal
government.102 Marshall argued that when Europeans settled in America, the rights of the
Indian tribes “as independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to
dispose of the soil, at their own will, to whomever they pleased, was denied by the
original fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made
it.”103 Eight years later, in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, Marshall put further limits on
tribal sovereignty. Marshall claimed that although Indian tribes qualify as sovereign
states, they should not be treated the same way as foreign states. He coined the term
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“domestic dependent nations” to describe the status of Indian tribes.104 A year later, in the
1832 decision Worcester v. Georgia, Marshall further outlined their sovereign status:
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct,
independent, political communities, retaining their original natural
rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial,
with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which
excluded them from intercourse with any other European potentate than
the first discoverer of the coast of the particular region claimed.105
Here Marshall is placing another limit on the tribes’ sovereign power — unlike other
sovereign nations, the Indian tribes could not conduct business with foreign governments.
The federal government is the only government with which they may interact. Thus, the
federal government holds sole authority to regulate Indian tribes — the power to regulate
commerce with the Indian tribes is vested in Congress in Article I, Section 8 of the U.S.
Constitution. Following from this, “Marshall, then, left a view of the tribes as nations
whose independence had been limited in only two essentials — the conveyance of land
and the ability to deal with foreign powers.”106 Without these powers what exactly does
tribal sovereignty entail? A tribe’s sovereignty puts it at an advantage vis-à-vis cities,
counties, and other local entities. Unlike such governments, tribes do not rely upon the
principle of delegation: “When a question arises as to the power of a city to enact a
particular regulation, there must be some showing that the state has conferred such power
on the city; the state, not the city is the sovereign body from which power must flow. A
104
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tribe, on the other hand, is its own source of power.”107 Do tribes, then, exercise the same
sovereignty as states? In some ways, they can exhibit more sovereign power: “A tribe’s
right to establish a court or levy a tax is not subject to attack on the ground that Congress
has not authorized the tribe to take these actions; the tribe is sovereign and needs no
authority from the federal government.”108 Therefore tribal sovereignty can be construed
as a negative right against the federal government: “The relevant inquiry is whether any
limitation exists to prevent the tribe from acting within the sphere of its sovereignty, not
whether any authority exists to permit the tribe to act.”109 This slightly resembles the
constitutional contrast between the legislative and executive branches. Whereas the
legislative branch can only exercise its enumerated powers, the executive can usually get
away with anything that is not expressly forbidden. This is one reason why, for example,
many Indian tribes have casinos on their reservations.
The most important sector of Indian law when considering the Klamath Basin
Restoration Agreement is, of course, water rights. Indian water rights are unique, and do
not align entirely with the riparian doctrine or prior appropriation. Indian water rights can
be traced to the 1908 Supreme Court case Winters v. United States. The case involved a
dispute between Indians and white settlers in Montana. The settlers diverted the flow of
the Milk River away from the Fort Belknap Reservation located on the river. This
interfered with the tribe’s irrigation system, and the Indians brought suit. The treaty
establishing the reservation did not mention any water rights. Therefore the settlers
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believed they could make a prior appropriation claim on the river.110 The Supreme Court
rejected this argument. In the majority opinion, Justice Joseph McKenna argued that the
treaty contained an implicit guarantee of water rights. He posited that “without a
guarantee of water Indians would not have agreed to abandon their nomadic ways to
become pastoralists and farmers.”111 Indians would not occupy agricultural lands without
an implicit guarantee of water. This was a major victory for the Indian tribes. They were
given another victory in the 1963 case Arizona v. California, which debated the
difference between water rights on Indian reservations established by statute and those
established by executive order. Justice Hugo Black, in the majority opinion, found no
difference between the two: “The Court viewed the question as one of the intention of
Congress or the President, and held that neither one could have meant to establish the
reservations without reserving for the use of the Indians the water necessary to make the
land habitable and productive.”112 The Court also held that water rights on Indian
reservations begin at the time of the reservation’s establishment. Several Indian water
rights have been extrapolated from these two court decisions. Known as “Winters rights,”
they are summarized as follows:
(1) Winters rights are creatures of federal law, which defines their
extent. (2) Establishment of a reservation by treaty, statute or executive
order includes an implied reservation of water rights in sources within
or bordering the reservation. (3) The water rights are reserved as of the
date of creation of the applicable portion of the reservation. Competing
110
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users with prior appropriation dates under state law take precedence over
the Indian rights, but those with later dates are subordinate. (4) The
quantity of water reserved for Indian use is that amount sufficient to
irrigate all the practicably irrigable acreage of the reservation…
(5) Winters rights to water are not lost by non-use.113
The first Winters right is arguably the most important for the Klamath Basin. Indian
reservations have a federal right to water, as opposed to other claimants in the region who
have only a vested state right. Therefore Indian claims to water on the Klamath are
arguably superior to the claims of irrigators. In principle, Oregon and California both
recognize the supremacy of the federal water rights. Remember, however, that both states
interpreted the Desert Lands Act to mean that the federal government relinquished
control of the public domain and that Congress would never assert any federal water
claims. Unfortunately for the Klamath Basin tribes, their Winters rights have been largely
ignored by Oregon and California, although more attention has been given to them in
recent years.114 Nonetheless, the tribes can still make a claim to a superior water right,
which can also be used as a bargaining chip in negotiations.
Because Winters rights are contingent on established reservations, the Klamath
Indians had problems asserting their water rights following the tribe’s termination in
1954. Without a reservation, it was unclear if the now terminated tribe retained any of
their preexisting water rights. In 1983, the Klamath tribe took this question to court. In
United States v. Adair, the United States District Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
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ruled in their favor. Consistent with the tribe’s Winters rights, the Court held that the
1864 Treaty of Council Grove “granted the Indians an implied right to as much water on
the reservation as was necessary to fulfill these purposes.”115 Next, the Court delivered a
major victory for the Klamath:
“The termination of the reservation did not abrogate the Indians’
water rights. The Indians are still entitled to as much water on the
reservation lands as they need to protect their hunting and fishing
rights. If the preservation of these rights requires that the marsh be
maintained as wetlands and the forest be maintained on a
sustained-yield basis, then the Indians are entitled to whatever water
is necessary to achieve those results.”116
The Court seemed to be endorsing the idea that Indian tribes held a superior appropriative
claim. The Court went even further, holding that “by the Treaty of 1864, the Indians
reserved hunting and fishing rights which they had exercised for more than a thousand
years. The priority date of these rights, and of the Indians' water rights which are
necessary to preserve their hunting and fishing rights, is time immemorial.”117 Therefore,
Indians had priority over all other water users due to their longstanding presence in the
region, which predates white settlement. While United States v. Adair was a victory for
the Klamath, it did not specifically quantify any of the tribe’s water rights. The Oregon
Water Resources Department interpreted United States v. Adair as limiting “Indian water
use to that sufficient to provide for a moderate living, capped by the level of hunting,
115
116
117

United States v. Adair, No. 75-914 (D. Or. September 27, 1979).
United States v. Adair
Ibid.
38

fishing, and gathering activity in 1979.”118 Thus, the state governments continue to find
their way around the court-mandated superiority of Indian water rights.
It is important to note that United States v. Adair focused particularly on the
Klamath’s fishing and hunting needs. Indeed, the Indian tribes in the Klamath Basin seek
water claims not for irrigation but for fishing purposes. “Neither Upper nor Lower Basin
tribes seek water for irrigation. Both do seek water for fish, and the courts have
confirmed that both have rights to water needed to support those fish.”119 This leads to
another important sector of Indian law: fishing and hunting rights.
Fishing has cultural and economic significance to the Indians in the Klamath
Basin. The tribes consume fish as food, and also generate income from fishing. The
Klamaths believe salmon (known as c’iyaal’s in the Klamath native tongue) are sacred
creatures, sent up the river by the creator to sustain their people.120 Echoing the implicit
adoption of water rights of Winters, all Indians have an implied right to freely hunt and
fish on their reservations, regardless of state laws and regulations. This implied right can
be traced back to the treaty, statute, agreement or executive order that established their
reservation. “Indeed, the treaty right to hunt and fish free from state law has been held to
survive a congressional termination of the trust relationship between the tribe and the
federal government.”121 While states cannot regulate hunting and fishing on Indian
reservations, the federal government may do so through its plenary power over Indian
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affairs. An Indian may not, for example, kill a wild panda bear if one somehow managed
to squanch its way onto an Indian reservation — that would be a violation of the
Endangered Species Act, a federal law. However, “the federal government has
[generally] been very sparing in the exercise of its power to regulate Indian hunting and
fishing. The matter has accordingly been left largely for tribal regulation.”122 Many
pieces of conservation legislation contain language exempting Indian tribes from certain
statutes. Some moderate state regulation of fishing has also been found acceptable by the
courts, such as Washington state’s requirement for a maximum percentage of a salmon
run a tribe may catch.123
As described earlier, the Klamath tribe’s fishing rights were affirmed in United
States v. Adair. The fishing rights of the Yurok and Hoopa tribes are both federally
recognized under treaty fishing rights, while also enjoying water rights to support
fisheries.124 The Karuk, however, are not so lucky. Due to their lack of a reservation, they
do not have a federally recognized fishing treaty, although they continue to seek one.
“History has left the Karuk in a kind of legal limbo, with minimal land and uncertain
hunting and fishing rights.”125 The Karuk’s lack of fishing rights has had a very negative
effect on members of the tribe. It has caused Karuk salmon consumption to drastically
decline and practically disappear from the Karuk diet. A 2004 study linked the decreased
salmon consumption to increased rates of diabetes and heart disease among the Karuk.126
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Indians occupy a unique place in American law, and thus they occupy a unique
place in the Klamath Basin. Their special water and fishing rights will come into play in
the negotiations leading up to the Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement.
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Chapter V
The Endangered Species Act and the Eruption of a Water Crisis
The Klamath Project, along with the Klamath River Hydroelectric Project, proved
to be less than ideal for local fish populations. It is no surprise that a project that diverts
rivers, constructs several dams, and changes water levels would have an adverse effect on
wildlife and their habitats. There are two ways in which fish are primarily harmed by the
water project: water depletion and entrainment. Water depletion is naturally bad for fish.
Fish need water to survive, and some species need greater amounts of water than others.
Fish also respond to acute changes in water temperature, as well as other water
characteristics such as salinity and pH level. Entrainment, the other way in which fish are
harmed by water projects, is defined as “the trapping of fish in project facilities, such as
irrigation canals or hydropower turbines.”127 Entrainment can kill fish directly or
indirectly through diversion into unsuitable or dangerous habitats.
From its inception, the Klamath Project paid little attention to, but did not
altogether ignore, the needs of local fish populations. When the first COPCO dam was
built in 1918, the California Oregon Power Company considered adding a fish ladder to
the dam, but concluded that “a fishway would not be effective, given the height of the
dam, and in any case that young fish moving seaward would be destroyed by the
turbines.”128 Without a way to cross the dam, many species would be cut off from the
upper reaches of the Klamath River, where many of their spawning grounds are located.
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Aware of this fact, the California Fish and Game Commission required COPCO to
establish a hatchery below the dam to account for the lost spawning grounds above the
dam.129 To this day, salmon swimming upstream from the ocean are still blocked from
hundreds of miles of the Klamath River. This has proven to be problematic for the
Klamath tribe. The remnants of the Klamath reservation are upstream of the dams,
rendering the Klamath unable to catch the downstream species of fish. Recall that
salmon, or c’iyaal’s, are perceived to be sacred and an integral part of Klamath culture.
Don Gentry, the Chairman of the Klamath Tribes, said, “‘We won’t be whole, and we
won’t be complete as a people until we can once again fish for our c’iyaal’s.’”130
Salmon and steelhead populations predictably declined following the construction
of the COPCO dam. The dam’s daily operations caused major disturbances in water
levels: “Demand for hydropower is high during the day and low at night. Operating
COPCO Dam in response to that fluctuating demand produced dramatic fluctuations in
river levels below the dam, drying out the river for miles daily and then inundating it.”131
Obviously a dry river cannot be conducive to a healthy fish population. The dry patches
disrupted migration patterns, stranded fish, and destroyed spawning beds. Commercial
fishermen also felt a disruption in their salmon flows. The hatchery at COPCO dam could
not possibly correct this. Making matters worse, the hatchery was closed in 1948.132 This
continued until 1959, when COPCO constructed Iron Gate Dam to moderate the
previously extreme water fluctuations. Under intense public pressure and in response to a
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lawsuit from the state of California, COPCO also agreed to construct a new hatchery to
replace the COPCO dam hatchery that had closed eleven years earlier.133 Although water
levels on the Klamath River were more constant following the construction of Iron Gate
Dam, concerns still existed over temperature fluctuations and water pollution caused by
the dams. However, advocates for temperature adjustment “did not find a sympathetic
audience. The [California] Fish and Game Commission refused to seek temperature
improvements because the costs would be very high and it would be difficult to prove
that the changes would measurably increase spawning success.”134 This makes sense
from a cost efficiency standpoint: while it is very possible that temperature fluctuations
are harmful to salmon and steelhead, it may be one of many factors affecting fish
populations. If the state undertook expensive temperature improvements and fish
continued to die, the money would be wasted. This is why some people argue for
complete dam removal — the dams are the cause of much of the fish decline in the
Klamath River, and any policy short of dam removal would be treating the symptoms
rather than the underlying cause.
Public sentiment against dam construction is not a recent phenomenon — indeed,
it dates back nearly a century. In the 1920s, following construction of the first COPCO
dam, the California Oregon Power Company proposed an additional two dams to be built
in the Lower Klamath Basin, one near the confluence of the Klamath and Shasta rivers
and another closer to the mouth of the Klamath River. These dams would be much further
downstream, further cutting off salmon populations from their habitats. These dam
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proposals proved to be incredibly controversial. Many believed that construction of these
dams would eradicate salmon from the Klamath River entirely.135 A public initiative
campaign was launched to prevent the construction of these dams. A statewide ballot
measure was adopted, and “in 1924, the people of California voted to forbid the
construction or maintenance of any dam or obstruction on the Klamath River below its
confluence with the Shasta River near Yreka.”136 It is somewhat surprising to see the
public show such sympathy for conservation measures, especially during the “roaring
20s” era when economic development was often given priority. Although no county-bycounty election results for the 1924 ballot measure are available, it would be interesting
to see if the counties of the Lower Klamath Basin voted differently than the rest of
California. If they did, it would give credence to the idea that the Klamath Basin is
ignored by the rest of California — the main reason behind the movement to establish the
State of Jefferson.
The hydroelectric dams were not the only entities disrupting fish. The Klamath
Project “has been closely linked with declines of the Lost River and shortnose suckers, as
well as other Upper Basin fish species.”137 Draining of Lower Klamath and Tule Lakes
eliminated their sucker populations. While the hydroelectric dams are arguably the most
damaging to fish populations, other dams used for irrigation purposes have also damaged
fish habitats. Agricultural activity in the Upper Klamath Basin can also pose a threat:
“Tributary channelization, accumulation of sediment, and high nutrient loads, from
agricultural runoff and the decomposition of drained wetland soils, are among the
135
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agriculture-related threats to the remaining sucker populations.”138 Even when
hydroelectric dams are removed from the Klamath River, these problems may continue to
exist. It is important to keep in mind that while the situation of fish in the Klamath Basin
can be improved, it is impossible for every problem to be solved.
Although less well known than the salmon and steelhead in the Lower Klamath
Basin, but equally if not more important, the Lost River and shortnose suckers were the
first species in the Klamath Basin to be listed under the Endangered Species Act. This
would be the first domino to fall in the events leading up to the negotiation of the
Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement.
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) was passed into law in 1973 under President
Nixon. The purpose of the ESA was to give the federal government ample enforcement
power to protect endangered species and their habitats. The ESA empowered two
different agencies to enforce the legislation: the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS or NOAA Fisheries). Both agencies operate
under different cabinet departments and have unique jurisdictions, both of which are
relevant to the Klamath Basin. The Fish and Wildlife Service, an agency of the
Department of the Interior, takes care of land species and freshwater fish, such as the
Lost River and shortnose suckers of the Upper Klamath Basin. The National Marine
Fisheries Service, an agency of the Department of Commerce, “is responsible for marine
species and anadromous fish such as the Lower Basin’s coho salmon.”139 Because the
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salmon and steelhead in the Lower Basin spend a part of their lifetimes in the Pacific
Ocean, they fall under NOAA Fisheries jurisdiction.
The ESA empowers the agencies to list species as either “endangered” or
“threatened.” A species is deemed to be “endangered” if it is in danger of extinction and
“threatened” if it is likely to become endangered.140 The classification of species as
endangered or threatened is contingent upon scientifically accurate findings — the
agencies may not simply decide to list a species under the ESA simply out of a desire to
do so. Conversely, the agencies may not ignore scientific findings and decide not to list
an otherwise endangered species. Nonetheless, scientific data on animal populations can
be interpreted in different ways, leading many to suspect “that political factors strongly
influence listing decisions.”141 The ESA “protects endangered and threatened species and
their habitats by prohibiting the ‘take’ of listed animals and the interstate or international
trade in listed plants and animals, including their parts and permits, except under federal
permit.”142 The term “take” is defined broadly, “so that prohibited activities include not
only capturing or killing a protected animal but also altering its habitat in any way that
causes injury.”143 The term “species” is also defined broadly under the ESA. Straying
from the traditional biological definition of the word, the ESA considers subspecies and
even populations of species to fall under the definition of “species.” This is important in
the context of the Klamath Basin, because many of the local fish species listed under the
ESA are actually populations of fish. Overall, the coho salmon species is not in
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immediate danger of vanishing off the face of the earth, but the population of coho
salmon in the Klamath Basin could very well die off.
When a species is listed under the ESA, the FWS and NMFS are obligated to
designate “critical habitat” for the species, or special geographic areas that are essential
for the survival of the species that must be protected.144 However, both agencies have
often ignored or refused to designate critical habitat for endangered species because such
a “designation tends to incite local political opposition, and the federal services regard it
as providing little in the way of conservation benefits.”145 Critical habitat can also be
difficult or impossible to identify, prompting the relevant agencies to avoid giving such a
designation in some cases. The agencies also publish “recovery plans,” which outline the
necessary action to revitalize species and to “restore [them] to ecological health.”146
In 1988, when the FWS listed the Lost River and shortnosed suckers as
endangered under the ESA, the decision was met with little opposition. The FWS did not
designate a critical habitat for the suckers, partly because such habitat was unidentifiable.
“FWS concluded that critical habitat would be difficult to identify because the vast
majority of the species’ historic spawning grounds were already blocked by dams.”147 In
other words, the FWS admitted that there were no critical habitats because they had
already been destroyed — all remaining habitats were artificial. The FWS attempted to
outline a recovery plan for the suckers in 1993, but “sucker populations were so low…
and the reasons for their decline so uncertain, that FWS acknowledged that it could not
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describe the steps necessary to achieve recovery. The best it could do was to call for the
establishment of a secure population of at least five hundred fish for each sucker stock
within twenty years.”148 With no real recovery plan and no designated critical habitat, it is
no surprise that the listing of the suckers went largely unnoticed. The agencies would be
much more aggressive in the future.
In 1997, the NMFS listed the coho salmon populations in southern Oregon and
northern California as threatened under the ESA. Unlike the FWS with the suckers, the
NMFS was aggressive with its designation of critical habitat. Nearly all of the Klamath
River and its tributaries were designated as a critical habitat for coho salmon. Many
irrigators and farmers on the Klamath were alarmed by this announcement, and feared
more government regulatations were incoming. However, no regulation of the flow of the
Klamath River came directly from its classification as critical habitat. “The critical
habitat designation identifies water quality, quantity, temperature, and velocity, all of
which can be effected by diversions, as essential features of critical habitat. It does not,
however, identify specific required values for those features.”149 In other words, the
NMFS knows that the coho salmon’s habitat is in danger, but they are not sure what an
ideal habitat would look like or how to achieve it.
It was well-known that water levels of the Klamath River affected salmon and
sucker populations, and it was only a matter of time before minimum water levels would
be mandated. In April 2001, NMFS and FWS released a biological assessment of coho
salmon and the endangered suckers, and concluded that irrigation from the Klamath
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Project was lowering the water levels to an amount unsuitable for their survival. The
agencies recommended minimal flows to be sent through Iron Gate Dam to protect coho
salmon, as well as a minimum water level for Upper Klamath Lake to protect the
endangered suckers.150 A minimum water level requirement for Upper Klamath Lake
would be especially concerning to farmers and irrigators, due to its role as the main water
storage source for the Klamath Project. Recall that Upper Klamath Lake is already very
shallow, and the yearly amount of water in the lake is at the mercy of the weather. During
dry years, the water levels in Upper Klamath Lake could be close to the recommended
minimum water level, leaving little or no water available for irrigation of the Klamath
Project.
The Bureau of Reclamation, the agency responsible for regulating irrigation flows
on the Klamath Project, felt legally pressured to acquiesce to NMFS and FWS’ demands.
Earlier in 2001, in Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Association v. Bureau of
Reclamation, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the Bureau must ensure that their operating
plans “would not jeopardize listed species or adversely affect their critical habitat.”151
This could not have come at a worse time. Since the listing of coho salmon as endangered
under the ESA in 1997, the Klamath Basin had enjoyed a few relatively abundant years in
terms of rainfall. The winter of 2001, however, was significantly more dry. The water
levels in Upper Klamath Lake were already low. On April 6, 2001, the Bureau released
its operations plan for the Klamath Project. Believing it had no choice, “the 2001 plan
allotted no water at all from Upper Klamath Lake for irrigation. That meant much of the
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acreage within the project would be left dry.”152 The Bureau still allowed irrigation water
to be taken from Gerber Lake and Clear Lake at normal levels. However, there was no
way to make up for the water lost from Upper Klamath Lake, and the water supply would
still be stretched critically thin — overall irrigation deliveries in the Klamath Basin
would be reduced by 90 percent.153
Klamath irrigators were understandably upset by this announcement. Their crops
depended on irrigation from the Klamath Project for survival. They also believed their
riparian and appropriative water rights were being violated. However, the Endangered
Species Act is a federal law, and therefore takes precedence over state water laws and
riparian rights. Oregon and California in theory both recognized the supremacy of the
federal government, but this belief had never been tested in the Klamath Basin. This was
the first time the federal government asserted its water rights in the region, trumping all
other state-invested rights that had been observed for the past century. Accusations of
bureaucratic overreach and federal tyranny were very common.
That summer, the floodgates of the Klamath Project were closed, cutting off
irrigators’ water supply and inciting mass public protests. In May 2001, “thousands of
area residents formed a bucket brigade to bring water from Lake Ewauna, where the
Upper Klamath Lake reservoir spills into the Klamath River, to an irrigation canal near
the local high school.”154 The protestors carried 50 buckets of water, each bucket
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representing a state, through downtown Klamath Falls.155 This was a symbolic protest
against federal overreach, with the 50 buckets emphasizing the importance of states’
rights. Some activists tried to take matters into their own hands: “The headgates [of the
Klamath Project] were illegally forced open several times in early July, and later a pipe
was run from Upper Klamath Lake around the headgates to an irrigation canal.”156 Local
authorities, many of whom were sympathetic to the irrigators, chose to ignore these
offenses and refused to do anything about them. Thus the federal government dispatched
federal marshals and FBI agents to protect the floodgates from being forced open. This
further added to local perceptions of distant federal authorities ignoring the will of the
people. Over the summer of 2001, Klamath Falls became a Mecca for anti-government
activists throughout the United States, much like Ammon Bundy’s recent armed
occupation of the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge. The people who flocked to Klamath
Falls considered themselves patriots and revolutionaries, pushing back against the
excesses of a tyrannical federal government. The protests may have continued
indefinitely if not for the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The attacks generated
sympathy for federal officials and turned national attention elsewhere.157
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Chapter VI
The Klamath Agreements
Fortunately, the summer of 2001 was a relative anomaly in the Klamath Basin.
The next few years saw more rainfall and snowmelt, allowing Upper Klamath Lake to
reach sufficient levels to allow for irrigation of the Klamath Project while observing the
minimum levels needed for sucker protection.158 Tensions in the Klamath Basin have
decreased since 2001, but they could surely boil over at any time. With the advent of
climate change and increasingly hot summers and dry winters, the prospect for a repeat of
the 2001 crisis is very real. Worse yet, it could become a regular occurrence. Recognizing
this, stakeholders in the Klamath Basin began negotiations on an agreement for the
basin’s water use. The patchwork of federal and state laws, regulations and court
decisions governing water use proved to be insufficient and often contradictory. A single
agreement would bring clarity and security. The negotiators, known as the Klamath
Settlement Group, spent several years working on the agreement. The Klamath
Settlement Group consisted of the four local Indian tribes, the relevant Oregon and
California county governments, seven non-governmental organizations and 26 private
individuals, companies and local irrigation districts.
Negotiators of the agreement generally fell into two different camps: those who
wanted to preserve the status quo of the Klamath Basin, and those who sought lasting
change. The first camp is primarily made up of irrigators and irrigation districts. They
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would like to continue to receive substantial amounts of water from the Klamath Project
regardless of its impact on endangered species and their habitats. In a perfect world,
irrigators “would be happy to see the ESA go away. Failing that, they want it
implemented with minimal impact on irrigation deliveries.”159 On the opposite end are
the Indian tribes, fishermen and environmental groups. Although their specific goals
vary, these groups would generally like “to revive a degraded ecosystem and redesign the
human footprint on it with a reduced agricultural base.”160 The state and county
governments played more of a mediating role in the negotiations, and had less of a clear
interest at stake. Their prerogative was to do what they perceived to be in the best interest
of their residents.
On February 18, 2010, after over eight years of negotiations, the Klamath
Settlement Group released the final draft of the Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement
for the Sustainability of Public and Trust Resources and Affected Communities. The
agreement is often referred to simply as the Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement or the
KBRA. Alongside the KBRA, they concurrently released the Klamath Hydroelectric
Settlement Agreement (KHSA), which outlined the processes for the removal of four
hydroelectric dams from the Klamath River. Although they are separate, the two
agreements are complementary. Every signatory of the KBRA agreed to support the
KHSA. Section II of the KBRA mandates that all parties support the hydroelectric
settlement. The KHSA could have been included as a subsection of the KBRA and there
would not have been any real difference. The reason the KHSA is separate from the
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KBRA is because PacifiCorp and other power companies are signatories. These power
companies did not play a role in the negotiations of the KBRA. Together, the KBRA and
KHSA are often referred to as the Klamath Agreements.
The 250 page agreement serves three main purposes: to determine water rights
and river usage among the various parties, to build a sustainable water supply for the
Klamath Basin that would not jeopardize wildlife, and to remove four hydroelectric dams
— Iron Gate Dam, COPCO 1, COPCO 2, and the John C. Boyle Dam. The agreement is
intended to be a long-term solution for the Klamath Basin. The agreement states, “the
term of the agreement as to contractual obligations shall be 50 years from the effective
date”161 Many actions and decisions taken on behalf of the Klamath Basin have only had
a short-term focus, and the agreement aims to provide a long-term solution for the
region’s sustainability going into the future. Hopefully this means that under the KBRA,
conflicts such as those of the summer of 2001 will not happen again.
An important characteristic of the KBRA is that it does not carry the full force of
law. It is simply an agreement between members of the Klamath Settlement Group.
However, the agreement does have the potential to become a law through congressional
authorization: “The parties acknowledge that implementation of certain obligations under
this agreement will require additional authorizations and appropriations by the United
States Congress, the California legislature, and the Oregon legislature.”162 Upon passage
of authorizing legislation, six federal agencies would become parties to the agreement:
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the NMFS, the FWS, the Bureau of Reclamation, the Bureau of Land Management, the
U.S. Forest Service, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Although the agencies played a
part in the negotiation of the Klamath Agreements, they could not legally sign onto them.
After the agreements’ release, the signatories of the agreement agreed to abide by its
terms until authorizing legislation was enacted. But some aspects of the agreement, such
as dam removal, (supposedly) needed congressional authorization before being
implemented. Therefore, in the interim period between the signing of the agreement and
congressional authorization, signatories would only be following a partial agreement.
This could prove to be problematic, which is why the agreement states it will only be
temporary if it never receives congressional authorization: “This agreement shall
terminate… if… by December 31, 2012, federal authorizing legislation has not been
enacted.”163 The agreement was later amended to expire on January 1, 2016. When the
deadline for congressional authorization passed in early 2016, it sent the agreement into a
tailspin, which will be discussed later.
Although the KBRA is multifaceted and complex, its water usage agreements can
be broken down into simple terms. Essentially, irrigators and others claiming water rights
from the Klamath Project, agreed to reduce the amount of water allocated to them in
exchange for a minimum guarantee of supply. While the irrigators would be getting less
water annually, they would avoid a repeat of the summer of 2001 when many irrigators
received little or no water from the Klamath Project. No party to the agreement wants
another crisis like that of 2001, so the agreement takes steps to guarantee more water to
irrigators in dry years while simultaneously keeping enough water in Upper Klamath
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Lake to protect the endangered suckers. The simple solution is to add water to Upper
Klamath Lake by increasing water storage. Dam removal would be the first step in
increasing water levels. The hydroelectric dams require a vast amount of water to
operate, and their removal would allow the Klamath River to flow more freely, putting
less demand on water from Upper Klamath Lake. The agreement also provides for
additional water storage by “breaching levees in the Williamson River Delta to add
approximately 28,800 acre feet of storage; reconnecting Barnes Ranch and Agency Lake
Ranch to add approximately 63,700 acre feet of storage; and reconnecting Wood River
Wetlands to Agency Lake to provide approximately 16,000 acre feet of storage.”164 The
KBRA also establishes a Water Use Retirement Program (WURP) in the Upper Klamath
Basin. WURP is a voluntary program through which irrigators claiming water rights on
the Wood, Sycan, Sprague and Williamson Rivers can retire their water rights. Irrigators
on these rivers can sell their water rights or lease them for a short term to the Bureau of
Reclamation.165 The four rivers all flow into Upper Klamath Lake, meaning that that with
decreased demands on upstream water, the water levels of Upper Klamath Lake would
naturally rise. The WURP is estimated to increase storage levels on Upper Klamath Lake
by 30,000 acre feet.166 The agreement assures that all the extra water received from these
projects would not be used for irrigation purposes, but rather to protect fish.167
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With more water flowing into Upper Klamath Lake — the main source of water
for the Klamath Project — the Bureau of Reclamation can more confidently enforce
limits on the amount of water used for irrigation. The additional water decreases the
likelihood the flow would have to be additionally curtailed during dry years. The
agreement limits irrigation diversions from Upper Klamath Lake to a total of 330,000
acre feet of water from March through October. Following the removal of dams and the
completion of other water storage facilities, this amount would increase to 385,000 acre
feet.168 This amount is about 100,000 acre feet less than the current demand for water
during a dry year. During wet years, the difference is lower.169 In the event of a water
shortage, which, due to the increased water levels in Upper Klamath Lake, would likely
only occur in an extreme drought, the agreement falls back on a Drought Plan, which
aims to seek alternative ways to provide water to irrigators. The agreement states, “the
parties intend that water and resource management actions be taken such that no Klamath
Basin interest shall bear an unreasonable portion of burdens imposed”170 during a
drought. The agreement hopes to avoid a crisis similar to that of 2001, when irrigators
bore the majority of the burden during the drought. While irrigators might not receive
much water from the Upper Klamath Basin during a drought, they could instead receive
water from designated groundwater sources and other water storage areas. The Drought
Plan also relies upon “voluntary water conservation measures… [and] leasing water on a
willing-seller basis.”171 The KBRA’s Drought Plan lacks some details, such as a specific
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guaranteed amount of water during dry years. Instead, the KBRA opts to address these
questions later, following congressional authorization. The agreement mandates that
stakeholders form a “Lead Entity” to provide a finalized drought plan.172 The solution for
water provision to irrigators during extreme drought seems slightly suspect. Relying upon
voluntary water conservation to provide water to thirsty crops seems like an unrealistic
expectation. Hopefully, the finalized drought plan will have more concrete solutions, but
it is possible that negotiations for the drought plan could take several years, or worse, go
on indefinitely.
It is strange that irrigators would agree to such a reduction in their water supply,
but irrigators do not occupy the same position of power they enjoyed in the past. With the
federal government increasingly flexing its muscles in its enforcement of the ESA,
irrigators felt they had no choice, and would rather see their water supply be reduced than
have none at all during dry years.
As mentioned earlier, the Indian tribes in the Klamath Basin could use their
superior water rights, as detailed in Winters v. United States and United States v. Adair,
to use as a bargaining chip to extract benefits. The tribes did exactly that. The tribes
fiercely advocated for dam removal, as it would likely increase fish populations in the
Klamath Basin, thus increasing fishing revenues. Additionally, dam removal would allow
salmon to swim north of Iron Gate Dam, allowing the Klamath tribe to be reunited with
their c’iyaal’s. Needless to say, the tribes got what they wanted. Additionally, the
agreement establishes a fisheries program that helps aggressively reintroduce fish to their
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old habitats.173 The Klamath Basin tribes are given a large degree of involvement in the
reintroduction process. In return, the Klamath, Yurok and Karuk tribes agreed to cede
some of their water rights. They also agreed to relinquish several claims and lawsuits
against the United States. These included:
All claims resulting from (a) water management decisions, including
the failure to act, or (b) the failure to protect, or to prevent interference
with, the Tribes’ water or water rights, that relate to damages, losses, or
injuries to water, water rights, land, or natural resources due to loss of
water or water rights (including damages, losses, or injuries to hunting,
fishing, gathering rights or other activities, due to loss of water or water
rights); … [and] all claims relating to the negotiation, execution, or
adoption of this Agreement and the Hydroelectric Settlement.174
Essentially, the Indians agreed to drop current water use lawsuits against the United
States and promised not to sue for a superior water claim — a suit they could very well
win due to their Winters and Adair rights. The Klamath tribe’s concession of its water
rights would free up more water to be distributed to irrigators in the Upper Klamath
Basin.
The agreement also gives the Klamath, Yurok and Karuk Indians access to an
interim fishing site near Iron Gate Dam.175 Most importantly the Klamath Indians got
their most prized possession: land. Upon congressional authorization of the KBRA, the
Klamath tribe would receive $21 million in appropriations. With these funds, the
173

Ibid, 38.
Ibid, 94.
175
Ibid, 171.
174

60

Klamath tribe will purchase the Mazama Forest Project, a 90,000 acre forest near
Chiloquin, Oregon that was formerly part of the Klamath Indian reservation.176
Technically, this land will be shared by the Klamath, Yurok and Karuk tribes, but due to
its geographical proximity to the Klamath reservation, it will most likely be primarily
used by the Klamath tribe. In return, the tribes agreed “that nothing in the development of
the Mazama Forest Project, including but not limited to the Klamath Tribes' purchase of
property, or the United States' designation of property as having federal trust status, will
alter existing law regarding the applicability of state water law.”177 In other words, the
tribes were swearing not to assert their Winters and Adair rights resulting from their new
land acquisition.
Interestingly, the Hoopa tribe did not sign on to the agreement, and in fact
vigorously opposes it. The Hoopa claim, “the agreements serve to ‘terminate’ tribal water
and fishing rights and provide irrigators a superior water right that does not currently
exist.”178 The truth of theses allegations is doubtful. The true reason for the Hoopa’s
opposition to the agreement may be that litigation is their preferred method to find a
solution to their problems.179 The tribe “may also be concerned that the cost of
implementing the Klamath Agreements, nearly $500 million in new federal spending
over 15 years, could affect funding for their restoration efforts on the Trinity [River].”180
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The Hoopa’s opposition to the agreement is a critical illustration of the fact that the
KBRA is not universally supported. Although it enjoys broad support from the
signatories, it has been met with deep suspicion from some members of the general
public. Several candidates in local elections, particularly in the northern California
counties, have included opposition to the Klamath Agreements in their candidate
platforms, and many have been successful.181 As will be discussed in the next chapter,
opposition to the agreement also runs deep in the United States Congress.
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Chapter VII
Moving Forward
As of April 2016, no authorizing legislation for the Klamath Agreements has yet
been enacted. In January 2015, Oregon Senator Ron Wyden introduced S. 133, the
Klamath Basin Water Recovery and Economic Restoration Act. Fellow Oregon Senator
Jeff Merkley cosponsored the bill, along with California Senators Dianne Feinstein and
Barbara Boxer. All four Senators are Democrats. The bill “authorizes, ratifies, and
confirms”182 the Klamath Agreements. Unfortunately, the bill has not seen any progress.
Senator Wyden had also introduced an authorization bill in the previous Congress, but
that too had gone nowhere. In a Republican-controlled Congress, it is difficult for
Democratic-sponsored legislation to gain traction without bipartisan support. Many
Republicans oppose dam removal because they fear it would set a precedent for
hydroelectric dams to be removed nationwide.183 Additionally, implementation of the
Klamath Agreements is estimated to require $96 million of annual federal

182

S.133 - Klamath Basin Water Recovery and Economic Restoration Act of 2015, 114th
Congress. https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/133.
183
Paige Blankenbuehler, “Hope Fades for Klamath River Accords,” High Country
News, February 2, 2016, accessed April 21, 2016, http://www.hcn.org/issues/48.2/hopefades-for-klamathriveraccords/standard_article_view?original_url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.hcn.org%2Fiss
ues%2F48.2%2Fhope-fades-for-klamathriveraccords%2Fstandard_article_view&form.button.confirm=Confi.

63

appropriations.184 Republicans are generally opposed to increases in government
spending unless they are absolutely necessary.
As discussed previously, the KBRA would be terminated if a congressional
authorization was not enacted by January 1, 2016. As 2015 drew to a close, it looked
increasingly likely that an authorization would not get passed. In December 2015,
Representative Greg Walden, an Oregon Republican whose district encompasses the
Klamath Basin, introduced a draft bill that would authorize the Klamath Agreements,
with one important difference: the bill did not include the agreements’ dam removal
provisions. With dam removal being a central provision of the agreements, Senators
Wyden and Merkley quickly rejected Walden’s bill. Walden insisted that excluding dam
removal from the authorization bill would be the only way it could get through a
Republican Congress. He also predicted (correctly) that perhaps dam removal would not
need congressional authorization. Walden “suggested that the dams could potentially be
taken out through the regulatory process, said he was trying to figure out a creative way
to build support for the agreement among his fellow Republicans.”185 Additionally, the
bill contained a provision that would cede 200,000 acres of National Forest land to
Klamath County in Oregon and Siskiyou County in California. Walden and Merkley said
“the idea of turning federal forests over to the counties was a nonstarter in the Senate.”186
Walden’s proposal quickly lost steam.
As December ticked by, it seemed that the only possibility for saving the Klamath
Agreements would be to introduce the authorization as an amendment in the year-end
184
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omnibus appropriations bill for the 2016 fiscal year.187 Unfortunately, the omnibus bill
was passed without any such amendment, and Congress recessed until the New Year.
When the deadline passed, the future of the Klamath Agreements seemed bleak. The
Yurok tribe withdrew its support for the agreements, and some irrigation districts
followed suit.188 It appeared as if all the years of hard work spent negotiating the
agreements had been for nothing. Once the agreement was terminated, the signatories
were no longer obligated to agree to its provisions. A crisis similar to that of the summer
of 2001 seemed imminent.
Fortunately, this bleakness only lasted for about a month. On February 2, 2016,
the Department of the Interior announced that it would approve removal of the four
Klamath River dams (Iron Gate Dam, COPCO 1, COPCO 2 and the John C. Boyle Dam)
without congressional authorization. PacifiCorp agreed to transfer the four dams to a
newly-created California nonprofit company, which would then petition the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission for permission to tear down the dams in 2020.189 Two
other hydroelectric dams, the Keno and Link River dams, would continue to operate but
would be transferred to the Bureau of Reclamation. The Bureau agreed to continue
operating the dams “without raising [electricity] prices for farmers and ranchers who
irrigate their fields.”190 Although this provision was included in the original KHSA, it
helped further assuage fears that dam removal would facilitate higher electricity rates for
irrigators.
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191

In the past, PacifiCorp signed on to the KHSA because it offered the company
liability protections.192 PacifiCorp’s decision to cede control of the dams was ultimately
an economic decision — removing the dams would actually save them money.
PacifiCorp’s FERC license to operate its Klamath dams will be up for renewal in 2020.
When applying for relicensing, PacifiCorp would have to demonstrate that their dams
live up to modern environmental standards — which would be difficult to do, considering
a few of the dams are almost a century old. As a condition of relicensing, PacifiCorp
would likely have to retrofit the dams and build several fish ladders. Retrofitting the
dams would actually cost more money than completely removing them. Thus, when
PacifiCorp was “presented with an opportunity to shed liability for damages related to
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removal of the dams, letting go of the Klamath River dams looks like a prudent financial
decision.”193
Ironically for opponents of dam removal, the removal of dams from the Klamath
River may end up being the only aspect of the Klamath Agreements that ends up
becoming a reality. While dam removal has been given the green light by the Interior
Department, the future of the remainder of the KBRA remains uncertain. Fortunately, its
future today is brighter than it was a few months ago. Granted, the old KBRA has been
terminated, but it could easily be revived and modified. With the Interior Department’s
approval of the removal of the four dams on the Klamath River, the KBRA’s dam
removal provisions can be struck from the agreement. This would face a much easier path
through Congress, given that the main reason for Republican opposition to Senator
Wyden’s bill is now gone. However, it is never prudent to put too much faith in the
United States Congress. It is also uncertain if all of the original signatories of the KBRA
will support a new agreement, considering that dam removal, a major priority of many of
the signatories, is now underway. For now, the signatories of the Klamath Agreements
must move forward with a new agreement. Although its future remains uncertain, there is
now more optimism than ever that the Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement will
ultimately become law.
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Conclusion
Because the Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement has not been authorized or
implemented, it is too early to tell if any party is a “winner” or a “loser” of the agreement.
The KBRA is, of course, a compromise, meaning that every party had to make a certain
amount of concessions. However, if any party thought they were a “loser” of the
agreement, or thought they were being treated unfairly, they would not have signed on to
the agreement in the first place. One thing is for sure: if the agreement is never passed
and the Klamath Basin continues to see incidents like those in the summer of 2001,
everyone is a loser. Water crises are never good for anybody. As the situation currently
stands, however, opponents of dam removal are the big losers. The dams are ready to be
torn down, but none of the other aspects of the Klamath Agreements have been put in
place.
Fortunately, the Klamath Agreements now have an easier path forward through
Congress. If a new agreement similar to the first KBRA is reached, but this time without
any dam removal provisions, the authorizing legislation would draw much less opposition
from Republicans. The Department of the Interior’s decision to decommission the
Klamath River dams may have been the breakthrough moment to finally bring stability
and clarity to the Klamath Basin.
The impact of the Klamath Agreements, once implemented, is not easy to foresee.
They might end up being a rousing success, or they could very well prove to be a
disaster. Fortunately, enough parties to the agreement have expressed their support so that
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one can say with confidence that the Klamath Agreements will make a positive impact on
the Klamath Basin. If the KBRA fails to advance, the Indian tribes, irrigators, fishermen
and all other parties will once again have to sift their way through a maze of litigation to
determine their water rights. If it becomes law, which it should, the Klamath Basin
Restoration Agreement will provide a clear and sustainable vision for the future of the
Klamath Basin.
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